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TOWARD TRANSACTION-SPECIFIC STANDARDS OF
DIRECTORIAL FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE TRACKING-
STOCK CONTEXT
Jeffrey J. Schick
Abstract: In recent years, diversified corporations have increasingly turned to tracking
stocks to uncouple high-growth businesses, especially Internet-related operations, from more
static business entities. Tracking stock is a unique type of common stock that represents an
interest in the financial performance of particular business groups within a diversified parent
corporation. However, the tracked business groups are not independent of the parent
corporation, and the parent's board of directors still governs the affairs of each business
group. This creates unique conflicts for directors who must please multiple groups of
stockholders whose interests are not always consistent. Delaware courts have not announced a
clear standard for dealing with directorial duties in the tracking-stock context. The three
existing legal standards of corporate governance-the traditional fiduciary analysis, a
contractual approach, and an entire-fairness evaluation-are individually inadequate when
applied to the unique directorial conflicts arising in corporations with tracking stock. This
Comment argues that Delaware courts should apply different standards of review to
directorial decisions involving tracked business groups depending upon the nature of the
transaction. Where the directorial decision involves primarily contractual arrangements, such
as the repurchase of stock or the payment of dividends, courts should not grant tracking
stockholders fiduciary protections. If the decision involves the allocation of corporate
opportunity or resources, courts should apply the fiduciary principles of care and loyalty,
ensuring that directors do not have a material self-interest in the transaction. Finally, if the
directorial decision involves inter-group dealings, courts should require directors to
demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction regardless of whether the board was
interested in the transaction.
After a decade of dormancy, tracking stock' has seen a revival in
recent years and has recaptured the eye of Wall Street.2 Companies such
as Sprint; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette; Disney; Ziff-Davis; and Circuit
City have all recently issued tracking stocks Over a dozen major
corporations, including AT&T, Staples, The New York Times, J.C.
1. Tracking stock, also known as "lettered" or "targeted" stock, is defined as stock tied to the
financial performance of a particular segment of a corporation's business. See Adam Lashinski, Will
the Boom in Tracking Stocks Derail Investors?, Fortune, Jan. 10, 2000, at 210-12.
2. Tracking stock is not a new phenomenon. The first tracking stocks were issued in the mid-
1980s by General Motors to track its former Electronic Data Systems and Hughes Aircraft
subsidiaries. See Jeffrey J. Hass, Directorial Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stock Equity Structure:
The Needfora Duty ofFairness, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2089, 2089 n.2 (1996).
3. See Susan Scherreik, Tread Carefully When You Buy Tracking Stocks, Bus. Wk., Mar. 6, 2000,
at 182.
1365
Washington Law Review
Penny, Dupont, and Cendant, among others, are in the process of issuing
tracking stock.'
Because tracking stock creates groups of stockholders within a
corporation with potentially competing interests5 and tasks a single board
of directors with governing the interests of these groups,6 tracking stock
can create decision-making nightmares for a board of directors. Delaware
courts have not provided guidance to these boards, having twice
examined the duties directors owe to tracking stockholders and having
twice declined to establish a clear standard.7
Although Delaware courts have attempted to apply the traditional
fiduciary duties of care' and loyalty9 to directors in corporations issuing
tracking stock, they have also suggested that duties owed by directors to
tracking stockholders are analogous to the directorial duties owed to
preferred stockholders0 or to minority stockholders" in a controlled
subsidiary. 2 Directorial duties owed to preferred stockholders are
predominantly contractual and defined by the terms of the corporation's
articles of incorporation. 13 In the case of minority stockholders in a
4. See id
5. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2118.
6. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., Prospectus, at 10 (filing date May 26, 1999).
7. See generally Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 746 A.2d 277
(Del. 2000); In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1999).
8. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
11. Minority shareholders are shareholders of a corporation who hold too few shares of the
corporation's total outstanding stock to control the management of the corporation. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1012 (7th ed. 1999).
12. See Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1123.
13. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Why We Should
Care About It), 51 Bus. Law. 443, 448 (1996). "Articles of incorporation" and "certificate of
incorporation" refer to the basic instrument filed with the secretary of state to establish the existence
of the corporation. Black's Law Dictionary 107 (7th ed. 1999). The contents of this document are
prescribed by statute, and include the corporation's name, purpose, authorized number of shares,
classes of stock, and additional conditions of operation. See id. This Comment will use "articles of
incorporation" when referring to this instrument.
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Transaction-Specific Directorial Duties
controlled subsidiary, the decisions of directors are subject to an
evaluation of the entire fairness 4 of the transaction. 5
This Comment argues that the traditional fiduciary analysis, the
contractual approach applied to preferred stockholders, and the entire-
fairness evaluation used in the case of parent-subsidiary dealings are
each insufficient legal standards when applied to directorial conflicts in
the tracking-stock context. This Comment proposes that courts apply a
combination of these three legal standards depending on the transaction
entered into by the corporation. Part I of this Comment introduces
tracking stock and explains the rationale behind its use. Part II discusses
the unique conflicts that directors of corporations with tracking stock
face. Part III summarizes three possible legal approaches to these
conflicts-a traditional fiduciary analysis, a purely contractual approach,
and an entire-fairness evaluation-and examines the Delaware courts'
efforts to apply these approaches to the tracking-stock context. Part IV
evaluates the effectiveness of these three approaches and argues that each
of these legal approaches is individually inadequate when applied to
tracking stock. Part V argues that courts should focus on the nature of the
transaction within the corporation when determining the rights of
tracking stockholders.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO TRACKING STOCK
A. The Tracking-Stock Equity Interest
Tracking stock is a separate class of common stock. 6 Like
conventional classes of common stock, tracking stock represents an
equity interest in the underlying assets of the corporation as a whole. 7
Unlike conventional classes of common stock, however, which track the
financial performance of the corporation as a whole, tracking stock
14. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
15. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del. 1971).
16. Common stock refers to "an equity security that has voting rights and is entitled to share in the
residual assets of the corporation on liquidations after the claims of creditors and other classes of
stock are satisfied." R Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations &
Business Organizations § 5A, at 5-7 (Supp. 2000).
17. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2094-95.
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derives its value from the performance of a single "business group" 8
within the diversified 9 parent corporation.20 A board creates tracking
stock by inserting provisions into the company's articles of incorporation
that define the components of the business group and the particular rights
of each class of tracking stock.2' The board may then choose to exchange
existing common stock for shares of tracking stock in each of the new
business groups22 or may simply redefine the interest of existing common
stockholders to exclude a particular line of business and offer tracking
stock in the excluded business group to the public. 2 3
The performance of a tracked business group is based on the earnings
performance and growth potential of the targeted business group.24
Stockholders invest in tracking stock on the premise that a particular
business group is-or has the potential to be-more profitable than the
corporation as a whole.25 A corporation will often issue tracking stock to
18. "Business groups" are artificial designations limited only by the imagination of the parent
corporation. Once a corporation adopts a tracking-stock structure, the entire corporation is divided
into groups that may include any combination of subsidiaries, geographic segments, or product lines.
See, e.g., Staples, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 3 (filing date Oct. 12, 1999) (creating one class of stock
for Staples.com, an Internet business, and separate class for Staples retail stores and delivery
services); Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 5 (creating DLJdirect to track on-line
investment house and DLJ to track conventional investment house); Sprint Corp., Prospectus, at 3-5
(filing date Feb. 5, 1999) (creating PCS business group to track only performance of wireless
services and separate FON business group to track performance of all other phone services-long
distance service, local service, product distribution and directory publishing activities, and other
telecommunications activities).
19. "Diversified" refers to any corporation operating two or more unrelated lines of business. See
Hass, supra note 2, at 2094 n. 14.
20. See, e.g., Sprint Corp., supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that PCS Stock was intended to reflect
separately performance of PCS Group and FON Stock was intended to reflect performance of FON
Group).
21. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2095.
22. See J. Roland Shiff, Virtual Spinoffs: Utilizing Tracking Stock to Decouple Lines of
Businesses, Tax Management Memorandum, Washington, Jan. 18, 1999, at S3-S6 (on file with
author).
23. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 3 (redefining DLJ common
stock to exclude interest in performance of on-line services of DLJdirect and offering DLJdirect for
sale to public).
24. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2094-95.
25. See Lisa Reilly Cullen, Tracking Stocks: No Free Ride, Money, Oct. 1999, at 52A.
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harness investors' enthusiasm for a particular line of business.26 For
example, Sprint Corp. issued a separate class of stock to track its wireless
services division in response to the skyrocketing popularity of wireless
communications.27
Although tracking-stock investors are entitled to dividends based on
the earnings of the targeted business group,28 investors are usually more
interested in the growth potential of the share value of the tracking
stock.29 Because tracking stock generally tracks a "hot" industry or line
of business, investors are quick to invest in the tracking stock and share
value rises rapidly.3" However, many of these emerging businesses
expend significant resources developing the business or expanding
market share3' and the tracked business groups may not be immediately
profitable.32 Moreover, because many targeted business groups only
contemplate long-range profits,33 dividend or other forms of payment are
not immediately available to tracking stockholders.34
Tracking stockholders invest in the performance of a business group
but do not acquire a direct ownership interest in the underlying assets of
the business group.35 Rather, the assets of the business group are still
owned by the corporation as a whole.36 This potentially limits the
tracking stockholders' claims to the assets of their particular business
group upon liquidation of that group because the assets must be divided
among all classes of common stockholders.37
26. See Lashinski, supra note 1, at 210-12.
27. See Sprint Corp., supra note 18, at 2-5.
28. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 22.
29. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2107 n.58.
30. In the year following Sprint's decision to issue tracking stock, Sprint PCS wireless tracking
stock saw a 400% increase in value, while the value of Sprint's FON stock increased 95%. See Fred
Barbash, Unease with Tracking Stocks, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1999, at HI.
31. Many tracking stocks, especially those competing in the Internet environment, focus on
growth rather than profit See Allan Sloan, Companies Creating New Coin in Push to Enter the
Internet Realm, Wash. Post, July 20, 1999, at E3.
32. See Gregory Dalton, The e-Business Dilemma, Info. Wk., Oct. 11, 1999, at 22-24.
33. In this respect, tracking stock does not differ from conventional classes of common stock in a
risky or emerging business. See Sloan, supra note 31, at E3.
34. Such growth-oriented tracking stocks often inform investors that dividends will not be
contemplated "in the foreseeable future." Sprint Corp., supra note 18, at 12.
35. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2096.
36. Seeid. at2097.
37. In addition, these assets may first be subject to the claims of creditors and preferred
stockholders. See id.
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B. Reasons for Issuing Tracking Stock
Tracking stock has become an attractive option for corporations for a
number of reasons. Corporations that engage in multiple business
ventures have looked to tracking stock as a means of unveiling the true
value of their businesses by uncoupling high-growth businesses from
more static companies. Recently, tracking stock has also gained favor as
a new form of currency, both to acquire other businesses and to lure
valuable employees from competing businesses.
1. Tracking Stock as a Mechanism for Unlocking Share Value
Tracking stock is commonly believed to "unlock" the hidden value of
corporations.38 A diversified parent corporation may believe that
investors are simply unable to assess the various holdings of the parent
accurately, thereby undervaluing the true potential of the corporation's
stock.39 Investors may not have the information or time necessary to
evaluate properly the value of businesses in a corporation's complex
financial reports.4 ° By issuing stock that tracks a particular business
group, corporations are able to highlight their most valuable businesses
and better educate the market.4'
For many companies, the development of Internet commerce has
intensified the desire to unlock Internet businesses from the corporation
as a whole. Internet companies are scrambling to expand their market
share, sustaining heavy losses in the process.42 Investors in Internet
38. See Lashinski, supra note 1, at 210-12.
39. See Harry Berkowitz, The Cutting Edge: Cablevision Systems Plans Tracking Stock, L.A.
Times, Dec. 23, 1999, at C7.
40. See Lashinski, supra note 1, at 210-12.
41. For corporations that have established reputations in now failing markets, tracking stocks are
especially popular. For example, Quantum, known primarily as a disk-drive manufacturer, has
struggled in connection with a downswing in the personal-computer and server market. However,
Quantum also manufactures tape drives, a thriving market within data storage. One market analyst
noted that "the value of Quantum's parts is greater than the whole... [a]nd Quantum wants to make
investors aware of this." Timothy Kendall, Show Me the Money, Forbes ASAP, May 31, 1999, at 22.
42. See Dalton, supra note 32, at 22-24 (noting that heavy investment in Internet technology,
marketing, and employees often generates pre-tax loss even in the most successful Internet
companies).
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companies not owned by traditional brick-and-mortar businesses
anticipate these losses.43 In contrast, investors in a corporation that owns
both Internet businesses and brick-and-mortar operations may be more
focused on the bottom line," and the losses from an Intemet-focused
group may reflect poorly on the share value of the corporation as a
whole.45 By issuing tracking stocks, a diversified corporation is able to
create separate financial statements for its Internet endeavors and brick-
and-mortar operations, thus clarifying investors' perceptions regarding
the respective financial status of each business within the corporation.46
2. Tracking Stock as an Acquisition Tool
Currently, corporations most commonly employ tracking stock as an
additional means of generating capital for the acquisition of other
businesses.47 Corporations may generate cash from the public offering of
tracking stock4" or use the tracking stock itself as consideration in future
acquisitions by exchanging tracking stock for stock in the acquired
corporation.49 Because tracking stock may raise the share value of a
diversified corporation's common stock by unlocking the value of a
particular business group, ° corporations may make larger acquisitions
with less stock.5
The development of the Internet has fueled the popularity of tracking
stock as a tool of acquisition.52 The rapid growth of Internet commerce
43. See Sloan, supra note 31, at E3 (stating that investment in Internet companies is "about
potential, hype and, in many cases, moonbeams. To the extent that numbers matter, they're numbers
like revenue or site visits. Profits? What are those?").
44. Dalton, supra note 32, at 22-24 ("Traditional brick-and-mortar investors don't understand
losses associated with building an Internet business."') (quoting Mark McDade, partner at
PricewaterhouseCoopers).
45. See id. ("It's hard to run a big dot-corn company inside a company that's measured by
earnings per share .... You have to limit how much you invest because every dollar spent affects
earnings.") (quoting Terry Jones, CEO of Saber Inc.'s Travelocity on-line unit).
46. See, e.g., Staples, Inc., supra note 18, at 42.
47. See Allan Sloan, Why AT&Tis Feeding Ducks, Newsweek, Dec. 13, 1999, at 71.
48. See Shiff, supra note 22, at S3-S6.
49. See Sloan, supra note 47, at 71.
50. See supra Part LB.1.
51. See Sloan, supra note 47, at 71 ("Issuing stock is how AT&T can pay more than $100 billion
for cable-TV companies and WorldCom can pay $115 billion for Sprint, the big long-distance and
wireless company.").
52. See Sloan, supra note 31.
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and the intense competition for market space provide companies little
time to develop new markets on their own 3 and increase the importance
of expansion through the acquisition of established companies. 4 Yet, the
acquisition of Internet companies with brick-and-mortar stock is often
impractical because corporations are reluctant to use stock in earnings-
based companies to acquire revenue-based55 Internet companies. 6
Further, Internet companies may be fearful that their growth potential
will be swallowed by a diversified corporation. 7 Tracking stock helps
resolve this dilemma by allowing a diversified corporation to issue a
separate class of stock for its revenue-based businesses and to trade that
stock for Internet businesses. 8
3. Tracking Stock as Employment Compensation
The Internet environment has spawned a third use of tracking stock-
compensation for employees.5 9 The limited pool of top Web designers,
programmers, operators, and executives has made it difficult for Internet
companies to retain talented employees.60 Many companies have turned
to offering tracking stock as a means of luring and retaining employees
with the potential of lucrative stock options, which might be diluted with
53. See Dalton, supra note 32, at 22-24.
54. See id. ("'Five years ago, we had the time to look at expanding into other markets .... Now
it's about protecting your vertical focus and then partnering for the rest."') (quoting Mack Tilling,
CEO of Instill Corp., a company working to establish on-line link between food distributors and
restaurants).
55. "Revenue-based" businesses are fledgling businesses that generate substantial revenue but
have been unable to turn a profit because of the operating expenses that accompany an emerging
business. Cf Sloan, supra note 31.
56. See id. ("'If you use your earnings-based stock to acquire a revenue-based property,... they
say your earnings are suffering, and they mark your shares down."') (quoting Tom Staggs, Disney
Corp.'s chief financial officer).
57. See id.
58. See id. ("'We've got to get more wampum. That means we've got to have more 'dot-corns.
Then we can trade our paper for somebody else's paper."') (quoting General Electric Co. Chairman
Jack Welch).
59. See Peter Coy, Tracking Stocks are Accidents Waiting to Happen, Bus. Wk., Aug. 22, 1999, at
33.
60. See id. (noting that Disney Corp. lost top executives to Internet startups).
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common stock.6" While tracking stock has allowed companies to retain
top employees, in addition to unlocking the share value of business
groups and creating currency for the acquisition of other companies, it
has generated new problems for corporate directors.
II. POTENTIAL DIRECTORIAL CONFLICTS IN TRACKING-
STOCK CORPORATIONS
Despite its apparent advantages, tracking stock presents directors with
unique hurdles that are not prevalent in conventional corporations. 62 In a
conventional corporation, all classes of stock share a unified financial
interest.' All classes of stock derive their share values from the financial
performance of the corporation as a whole,' which reflects the aggregate
of the individual performances of the business groups within the
corporation.65 Thus, if the directors of the corporation make a decision
that favors one business group at the expense of the others, but the
corporation's value as a whole is increased, each class of stockholders is
satisfied.'
Like conventional corporations, corporations with tracking stock are
governed by a single board of directors.67 However, in corporations with
tracking stock, directors face groups of stockholders with substantially
divergent interests.6' By definition, tracking stock creates classes of stock
that derive their value from different parts of the corporation, not from
the corporation as a whole.69 This apportionment places directors in a
position of simultaneously maximizing the wealth of multiple business
groups within the corporation.70
61. See Bruce Orwall, Disney Agrees to Buy Majority Stake in Infoseek, Wall St. J., July 13, 1999,
at B7 (noting that Disney's inability to offer stock options in Internet company hampered its efforts
to recruit top workers).
62. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2091.
63. Seeid. at2114.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 2094-95.
66. See id. at 2114.
67. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 10.
68. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2118.
69. Because tracking stock derives its value only from a particular business group, holders of that
stock have little interest in the financial success of other business groups or the corporation as a
whole. See supra Part LA.
70, This dilemma has caused some boards to reject tracking stocks. See Gregory Dalton,
Companies Seek Easier Money With Net Issues, Info. Wk., Oct. 4, 1999, at 181; see also Hass, supra
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Tracking stock further complicates the directors' position by creating
an opportunity for directors to obtain disparate financial interests in
different business groups within the corporation.7 If a director owns a
disproportionate interest, in percentage and value, in certain classes of
stock, that director has a personal financial interest that could
compromise the decision-making process with respect to competing
business groups.72
Directorial conflicts predominantly arise in three situations. First,
directors face potential conflict whenever they must allocate corporate
assets, resources, opportunities, or personnel to one business group at the
expense of another. Second, directors encounter conflicted interests
among stockholders when repurchasing stock or paying dividends on one
class of stock. Third, directors face potential conflict whenever they
negotiate contracts between two business groups within the corporation.
A. Conflicts Arising from the Allocation of Corporate Resources,
Assets, and Opportunities
Whenever the board of a corporation with tracking stock is required to
allocate corporate assets, resources, opportunities, or personnel between
business groups, the board potentially favors one group of stockholders
at the expense of another.73 To illustrate this point, suppose Tracking-
Stock Corporation (TSC) is composed of Business Group A (Group A)
and Business Group B (Group B). Group A stock tracks Internet
Company, an on-line electronics store, while Group B stock tracks Brick-
and-Mortar Company, an off-line electronics store. TSC directors must
allocate limited resources between Group A and Group B. For example,
note 2, at 2118 (stating that "substantial divergence of financial interest that exists between different
classes of tracking stock sets the stage for a potentially explosive sibling rivalry").
71. It is not uncommon for directors to own disproportionate interests in classes of stock. See.
e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 11.
72. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2132-39 (discussing methods of calculating disproportionate equity
positions among directors).
73. Although the directors of conventional diversified corporations are faced with the same
decisions regarding the allocation of resources, opportunities, and personnel, their only concern is
the impact of those decisions on the corporation as a whole-not on particular business groups. See
Hass, supra note 2, at 2121 n.97.
1374
Vol. 75:1365, 2000
Transaction-Specific Directorial Duties
the TSC board of directors must allocate a limited amount of capital and
credit. If the supply of capital or credit is exhausted to satisfy the
demands of Group A, the projects of Group B will not be undertaken.74
Conflict also arises whenever directors redistribute corporate assets
among business groups. 5 Suppose the TSC board discovers that
computer sales have declined at Brick-and-Mortar Company but are
extremely popular on-line. The board might allocate the resources of its
computer-manufacturing subsidiary exclusively to Group A to encourage
the on-line sales of computers. While this decision may benefit the
overall performance of TSC and the performance of Group A stock, it is
clearly to the detriment of the owners of Group B stock.76
Directors must also make difficult decisions when allocating corporate
opportunities among business groups. The most significant conflicts arise
when two business groups engage in substantially similar businesses.77
For example, suppose that a school district approaches TSC with an offer
to purchase 2000 computers. TSC's board of directors must then decide
which business group accepts the offer. If the corporate opportunity is
substantial enough, the loss of that opportunity by one business group
may cause its stock value to fall.78
Directors may also injure one class of stockholders when seizing
corporate opportunities that pose a significant risk for a particular
business group.79 A high-risk business venture may present the
possibility of tremendous profit to a particular group. Yet, because the
tracked business groups within a corporation share liabilities with one
74. Cf id. at2121.
75. Recently acquired business groups may be especially at risk if "old-school" management is
reluctant to share resources with a new business. Marcia Vickers, Are Two Stocks Better Than One?
Tracking Stocks Mix Blue-Chip Securities with Sky-High Value-But There is a Downside, Bus.
Wk., June 28, 1999, at 98.
76. A similar scenario arises, for example, when TSC's board determines that an executive of one
business group would be more valuable running the affairs of another.
77. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2122. This conflict is increasingly common as corporations issue
tracking stock for brick-and-mortar companies and Internet companies engaged in the same
business. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 14 ("DUJ and DlJdirect are
both engaged in brokerage and related investment service businesses. DLi is not restricted from
competing with DLJdirect and there can be no assurance that DLI will not expand its operations to
compete with DLJdirect').
78. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2123.
79. See, e.g., Nikhil Deogun, Pittson Plans to Sell Coal Business and Scuttle Its Tracking-Stock
Effort, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1999, at B16 (noting that coal businesses "cast a shadow" on other two
tracked business groups).
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another, but not profits, the risk may not be in the best interest of the
corporation as a whole.8"
B. Conflicts Arising from Stock Repurchases or Dividend Payments to
One Class of Stockholders
Whenever a board of directors of a corporation with tracking stock
decides to repurchase shares of a single class of common stock or
authorizes dividend payments on one class of common stock, the board
faces groups of stockholders with potentially divergent interests.81
Because the corporation owns the assets of the business group, 82 directors
must use the wealth of the corporation as a whole for stock repurchases
and dividend payments." This reduces the pool of corporate funds
available to other groups of stockholders and creates financial conflict
among classes of stockholders.84
C. Conflicts Arising from Transactions Between Competing Business
Groups Within a Tracking-Stock Corporation
Directors also face the prospect of dissatisfied stockholders whenever
the board negotiates transactions between business groups within a
corporation using tracking stock. One business group may look to
another group within the corporation for credit, assets, or services. One
group's receipt of a "good deal" may be at the financial expense of
another class of stockholders. 86 For example, suppose Staples, Inc. used
its retail delivery trucks to deliver products purchased from Staples.com,
its on-line business. Because the business group for Staples.com does not
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 22.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 70.
84. See id.
85. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2126 n. 115 (noting that transactions parallel "common director"
transactions-transactions between two corporations that have one or more common directors on
their boards-governed by duty of loyalty).
86. See id.
1376
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include delivery services," stockholders of tracking stock in Staples.com
would receive free delivery services while stockholders of tracking stock
in Staples' retail stores and delivery services would provide a service
without compensation.
In light of these potential conflicts, stockholders need some assurance
that directors will not subvert stockholder interests for self-interested
reasons. Likewise, directors must be able to navigate the minefield of
inter-stockholder conflict with some degree of protection. The Delaware
Court of Chancery has twice encountered the unique directorial concerns
present in tracking stock corporations and, on both occasions, avoided
the application of a single, definitive legal standard.8 Thus, directors and
stockholders in corporations issuing tracking stock continue to ponder
the same question: What duties do directors owe to tracking
stockholders?
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO DIRECTORIAL CONFLICTS IN
CORPORATIONS WITH TRACKING STOCK
At least three existing legal standards for corporate governance
present possible solutions for defining the scope of directorial duties in
corporations issuing tracking stock. First, courts could treat corporations
issuing tracking stock identically to conventional corporations, applying
the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the problems
presented by inter-group conflict. Second, courts could choose to treat
tracking stockholders similar to preferred stockholders and look
primarily to the certificate of incorporation to determine the legal rights
of these holders. Third, the court could treat tracked business groups as
controlled subsidiaries of a parent corporation, granting holders of
tracking stock the same rights and protections as minority stockholders in
a controlled subsidiary.
87. See Staples, Inc., supra note 18, at 3.
88. See Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff'd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000);
In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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A. Traditional Fiduciary-Duty Analysis and its Application in the
Tracking-Stock Context
1. Fiduciary Duties of Care and Loyalty
Corporate directors owe stockholders the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty.89 The duty of care ensures that corporate directors are adequately
informed about the affairs of their corporation by requiring review of
pertinent information before making business decisions, as well as proper
monitoring of the activities of the corporation.9" Under the business
judgment rule, courts will not disturb a board's decision as long as the
directors show that they "'acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."' 9 This rule reflects the view that directors are better equipped
than judges to make corporate decisions. The duty of loyalty ensures
that the interests of stockholders are not subordinated to the personal
interests of a corporation's directorship.93 Self-interested transactions 94
are not initially subject to the protection of the business judgment rule.95
If a challenging stockholder demonstrates a material conflict of interest
between the corporation and a majority of its directors, the burden shifts
to the defendant directors to prove the entire fairness of the transaction.96
89. See Balotti & Finkelstein, supra note 16, § 4.35, at 4-232.
90. See id. § 4.34, at 4-215 to 216
91. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
92. See id.
93. See Balotti & Finklestein, supra note 16, § 4.35, at 4-233.
94. "Self-interested transactions" refer to those situations in which directors stand on both sides of
the transaction. See id. Delaware has enacted a statute to govern self-dealing by directors. See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2000). Under this statute, no contract or transaction is void solely because
an interested director voted on the matter if the contract or transaction was (1) approved by a
disinterested quorum of directors, (2) approved in good faith by an informed vote of shareholders, or
(3) fair as to the corporation at the time of the transaction. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144(a).
95. See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he business judgment rule
presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest.").
96. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995); see also Weinberg
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When directors... are on both sides of a transaction,
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The concept of entire fairness has two aspects: fair dealing and fair
price.97 Fair dealing is essentially a procedural inquiry focusing on "when
a transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated,
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained."98 Fair price examines the substance of the
transaction, including "all relevant factors: assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic
or inherent value of a company's stock."" Because fair dealing is
generally easier to determine than fair price," ° entire fairness is
predominantly an evaluation of the procedure employed by the
directors.' Although the burden initially rests on the directors to prove
the entire fairness of the transaction,"°2 self-dealing directors may reclaim
the protections of the business judgment rule by a showing that the
transaction was ratified by a majority of fully informed stockholders.' 3
2. Delaware's Application of the Duty-of-Loyalty Test in the
Tracking-Stock Context
In General Motors Class H Shareholders Litigation,' the Delaware
Court of Chancery held that traditional fiduciary duties do apply in the
tracking-stock context"5 and dismissed each of the plaintiffs' claims.0 6
General Motors involved complaining shareholders challenging a series
of transactions (the "Hughes Transactions") that restructured the Hughes
Electronics business group associated with their tracking stock.0 7 In
they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of
the bargain.").
97. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
98. Weinberg, 457 A.2d at 711.
99. Id.
100. Even in the case of fungible objects traded in an efficient market, there are no perfect models
for identifying fair price. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke
L.L 425,473-74 (1993).
101. See id.
102. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 892 (Del. 1985).
103. See id
104. 734 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1999).
105. See id. at 619 ("Although the particular features of the classes of stock involved in an
individual case may have significance, the general fiduciary principles are the same.").
106. See id
107. Seeid at616.
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addition to other claims,"°8 the shareholders alleged that General Motors
directors used an unfair process to establish the terms of the Hughes
Transactions and thereby breached their fiduciary duties in apportioning
proceeds of the transactions among holders of the Hughes tracking stock
and shareholders of other General Motors common stock.0 9 The
shareholders further claimed that General Motors directors failed to
inform themselves about the value of and rights attached to the tracking
stock, coerced the tracking-stock shareholders to vote for the Hughes
Transaction, and attempted in bad faith to deprive tracking-stock holders
of their premium under a provision in the certificate of incorporation."'
Although the opinion dealt summarily with the duty-of-care claims,"'
the court offered significant discussion of the duty of loyalty." 2 In
determining when the duty of loyalty is triggered, the court rejected the
argument that stockholders may establish a material conflict of interest
merely by alleging that directors of a corporation with tracking stock
treated one business group unfairly or that a director had a
disproportionate interest in one class of tracking stock."' The court held
that the protection of the business judgment rule remains intact unless the
director's disproportionate interest in a particular class of stock is
material."' A disproportionate interest is not material unless the
directors' stockholdings "were so substantial as to have rendered it
improbable that those directors could discharge their fiduciary
obligations in an even-handed manner.""' 5 Because the plaintiffs failed to
plead specific facts demonstrating the materiality of interests of the
108. See id. at 615 (alleging breach of contract and breach of duty of disclosure claims).
109. Seeid. at 616.
110. Seeid.
111. See id. (acknowledging possibility of duty of care claims but dismissing such claims without
significant discussion because General Motors had exculpatory provision in its certificate of
incorporation barring duty-of-care claims against directors).
112. See id. at 616-19.
113. Seeid. at 618.
114. See id.
115. Id. The court may look to the director's financial circumstances to determine the materiality
of the holdings. See id. at 617.
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members of the General Motors board of directors," 6 the court held that
the Hughes Transactions were protected by the business judgment rule.'17
Three days after the decision in General Motors, the court in Solomon
v. Armstrong.. again rejected duty-of-loyalty claims-this time in the
context of a corporation's decision to spin off a tracked business
group.19 In Solomon, plaintiff shareholders alleged that General Motors
directors had breached the duty of loyalty in connection with the spin-off
of Electronic Data Systems (EDS), a business group tracked by General
Motors Class E Common Stock. 20 The shareholders alleged that the
spin-off amounted to a self-dealing transaction, that the negotiation
process did not provide a fair approximation of an arm's-length dealing,
and that the directors disseminated materially misleading information
about the spin-off and failed to inform the shareholders that consent to
the spin-off constituted a waiver of their recapitalization right.12' The
court applied the business judgment rule to the board's decision to spin-
off EDS" and dismissed the duty-of-loyalty claims.2 3 As in General
Motors, the court found that the complaining shareholders did not allege
facts demonstrating that the personal financial interests of the directors
were sufficiently material to bias the decision-making process.2
In addition to restating the materiality requirement set forth in General
Motors," the Solomon court examined whether directors owe fiduciary
duties to each group of shareholders individually or to the corporation
itself.26 The court concluded that the process for allocating value must
116. See id. at 617.
117. See id. at 616.
118. 747 A.2d 1098 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000).
119. Id. at 1106.
120. The spin off provided for a one-to-one exchange of General Motors Class E stock for EDS
shares, new information-technology service agreements, and a $500 million lump-sum cash-transfer
payment from EDS to General Motors. See id
121. See id. at 1106 (explaining shareholders' recapitalization right, which provided that tracking
stockholders receive General Motors common stock worth 120% of market value of their tracking
stock in event that tracked business group was recapitalized, sold, transferred, or assigned to any
entity in which General Motors was not majority owner).
122. See 1d. at 1117.
123. See id. at 1117-18.
124. See id. at 1118 ("[It is well established that when a party challenges a director's action
based on a claim of the director's debilitating pecuniary self-interest, th.t party must allege that the
director's interest is material to that director.").
125. See id. at 1123-24.
126. See id.
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be reasonably aimed at providing a fair result to all shareholders taken
together and to each and every class of shareholders taken separately. 2 7
However, this conclusion provides little protection for shareholders when
the allocation process, regardless of its impartiality, produces
consistently unfair results.
B. Treatment of Preferred Stockholders and the Application of the
Contractual Approach Toward Tracking Stock
The courts' treatment of preferred stockholders provides another
possible standard to determine the directorial duties owed in the tracking-
stock context. Preferred stock is stock that derives certain advantages
over common stock from a corporation's charter. a8 The advantages often
take the form of priority upon liquidation or payment of dividends.2 9
Unlike common stockholders, whose dividends depend on capital
appreciation or increased profits of the corporation, preferred
stockholders usually realize gain from fixed dividends. 3 The payment of
these fixed dividends is similar to interest on a loan; in this respect,
preferred stock is more analogous to a debt instrument than to common
stock."'
Courts have viewed preferred rights as essentially contractual.' 32 This
view is partially based on the theory that preferred stockholders have
bargained away their status as common stockholders in exchange for
preferences regarding dividends and liquidation. 33  Furthermore,
preferred stockholders have freely assumed the risk that their
investments would be subordinated to the interests of common
127. See id. (stating that if process is reasonably aimed at providing fair result, business judgment
rule remains in effect).
128. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 445.
129. See id. at 443,445.
130. See id. at 451.
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
133. See, e.g., Guttmann v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1951) ("Here we
are interpreting a contract into which uncoerced men entered . . . . [P]referred stockholders are
not .... wards of the judiciary.").
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stockholders'34 by voluntarily purchasing preferred stock rather than
common stock or debt instruments.
35
Courts have chosen to limit the application of fiduciary duties to
preferred stockholders in two significant ways. Courts have applied
fiduciary duties only (1) where the right asserted is not a preferential
right, and (2) when the duties do not impede the rights of common
stockholders. 36 With respect to the first limitation, the crucial question
regards which rights are preferences.'37 The Delaware Court of Chancery
in Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. 38 stated that matters relating to
preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred stock from common
are essentially contractual, and that "the scope of the duty is
appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that
contract."' 39 Further, where the right asserted involves a right shared
equally with the common stockholders, fiduciary duties apply. t4 ° If a
court determines that a matter involves a preferred right, the duties of the
directors will be defined entirely by the articles of incorporation.' 4 ' If the
preference right involves something as straightforward as the payment of
dividends, this determination is simple.'42 However, if a corporation has
not clearly defined the scope of the right in the articles of incorporation,
judges must make a determination as to whether the right at issue is
preferred. 4 3 Courts have generally chosen to define "preferred interests"
broadly, avoiding the fiduciary-duty analysis entirely.'
The second limitation-that directors owe preferred stockholders no
fiduciary duties when the exercise of those duties impedes the rights of
common stockholders-finds its rationale in the traditional corporate-law
134. Courts allow transfers of corporate wealth away from preferred stockholders when the
transfers are made for the benefit of common stockholders. See infra notes 145-48 and
accompanying text.
135. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 452.
136. See, e.g., Jedwab, 509 A.2d at 594.
137. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 448. "Preferences" generally include priority over common
shareholders in (1) receiving dividends, and (2) receiving distributions in the event of liquidation.
See id. at 446.
138. 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
139. L at 594.
140. See ia.
141. Seeid.
142. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 448.
143. See iad
144. See, e.g., Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984).
1383
Washington Law Review
mandate that directors always act in the interests of common
stockholders. 45 The net effect of this limitation on fiduciary duties is that
preferred stockholders have little protection against the unilateral transfer
of corporate wealth from preferred stockholders to common
stockholders. 4 6 As long as the actions of the directors maximize the
wealth of common stockholders,147 preferred stockholders must rely
solely on the protections granted in the certificate of incorporation.148
Although the Delaware Court of Chancery has not explicitly applied
the law regarding preferred stockholders in the tracking-stock context,
the court has drawn analogies between preferred and tracking
stockholders.'49 In dismissing the duty-of-loyalty claim, the General
Motors court relied on a series of cases involving preferred stockholders
in which a breach-of-charter provision' 50 was purely contractual and
could not be asserted as a duty-of-loyalty claim.' In Solomon, the court
also emphasized the contractual nature of tracking stock, claiming that
the bargaining process at the time of issuance provided the arm's-length
dealing necessary to ensure procedural protections for fairness.'52
According to the Solomon court, such a bargaining process provides
protections for tracking stockholders superior to any of the procedural
safeguards (for example, special committees, and burden shifts) created
by courts. ,53
145. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 450.
146. See id. at 450-51.
147. See id. at 450.
148. See id. at 451.
149. See In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 619 (Del. Ch. 1999)
(stating that existence of tracking stock "does not distinguish this case from those in which boards
had to balance the interests of different classes of common and/or preferred stockholders").
150. A charter provision is any provision found in the corporation's certificate of incorporation.
See, e.g., Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 835, 841-42 (Del. Ch. 1997). These provisions may govern
such rights as the ability of one class of stockholders to convert their shares to another class of stock.
See id.
151. See General Motors, 734 A.2d at 619.
152. See Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del.
2000). This rationale seems akin to the notion that fiduciary duties should not protect preferred
stockholders who have freely bargained for the terms of their relationship with common
stockholders. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
153. See Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1124.
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C. The Duties of a Parent Corporation to a Controlled Subsidiary and
the Application of the Sinclair Test to Tracking-Stock Corporations
Delaware law governing the directors of a controlled subsidiary of a
parent corporation offers another possible standard for directorial
conduct in tracking-stock corporations. In Sinclair Oil Corporation v.
Levien,54 the Supreme Court of Delaware held that parent corporations
owe a fiduciary duty to their subsidiaries in the event of parent-
subsidiary dealings. 55 The Sinclair court concluded that the existence of
this fiduciary duty alone does not invoke enhanced scrutiny by the
courts. 56 However, if the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-
dealing-that is, when the parent stands on both sides of a transaction
with its subsidiary-courts will examine the "intrinsic fairness"' 57 of the
transaction.'58 Under the Sinclair test, "[s]elf-dealing occurs when the
parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the
subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from
the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority
stockholders of the subsidiary."' 5
9
Under Delaware law, the burden of persuasion regarding the entire
fairness of the transaction rests on the defendant directors."6 The
defendants may shift this burden to the plaintiff if a committee of
independent directors ratifies the decision.6 Regardless of where the
burden rests, the conduct of the parties will be viewed under the more
154. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
155. Id. at 720.
156. Id.
157. Intrinsic fairness is synonymous with Weinberg's "entire fairness"' test. See Oberly v. Kirby,
592 A.2d 445, 469 (Del. 1991) ("The standard for intrinsic fairness is the searching test announced
in Weinberg. The interested directors bear the burden of proving the entire fairness of the transaction
in all its aspects, including both the fairness of the price and the fairness of the directors' dealings.").
This is also the same test used in Delaware's interested director statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §
144(a)(3) (2000). See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 n.7 (Del. 1995)
(stating that section 144(a)(3) codifies entire-fairness test).
158. See Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
159. Id.
160. See Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (citing Weinberg v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701,710 (Del. 1983)).
161. See id. at 428 (citing Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del.
1994)).
1385
Washington Law Review
exacting standard of entire fairness rather than the more deferential
business judgment standard. 162
Delaware courts have held that the entire-fairness standard remains
applicable even after ratification by an independent committee "because
the underlying factors which raise the specter of impropriety can never
be completely eradicated and still require careful judicial scrutiny."'63
The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that this policy reflects the reality
that in a parent-subsidiary relationship, a risk exists that minority
stockholders may be influenced by the prospect of retaliation by a
controlling stockholder.)"
In Solomon, the court rejected the argument that tracking-stock
corporations-by the nature of their capital structure-automatically
trigger the fairness requirements of parent-subsidiary dealings.'65 Holders
of Class E stock claimed that they were akin to minority shareholders
being frozen out of their continuing interest in the corporation."' The
court, however, distinguished the case from a traditional freeze-out based
on procedural safeguards in General Motors's certificate of
incorporation, including voting rights,167  dividend rights,'168  and a
provision setting a mandatory exchange rate in the event of a forced
transaction."' The court held that these provisions protected the tracking
162. See id. (citing Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994)).
163. Id. (citing Weinberg v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)).
164. See id. (citing Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch.
1990)).
165. Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1999), afj'd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del.
2000).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 1121. General Motors's certificate of incorporation provided that each class vote
independently on any amendment that affected that class's rights, powers or privileges. Thus,
holders of tracking stock could have effectively vetoed any proposed spin off. See id.
168. See id. General Motors's certificate of incorporation also limited the board's ability to pay
dividends on any one of the three classes of common stock. These limitations protected tracking-
stock shareholders from retaliatory dividend policies had the Class E shareholders vetoed the split-
off. See id.
169. See id. Under the Exchange Rate provision in the certificate of incorporation, Class E
shareholders would receive an automatic 20% premium above the value of the Class E stock to be
paid in the form of one and two-thirds shares of General Motors common stock. This provision
would provide additional protection to shareholders if the board were to retaliate by forcing the
exchange of Class E stock. See id.
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stockholders from continuous oppression by the common stockholders.'70
This holding reveals the inherent difficulty in applying a single existing
legal standard to directors of corporations with tracking stock: tracking
stockholders share some, but not all, of the dangers faced by common
stockholders, preferred stockholders, and stockholders in a controlled
subsidiary.
IV. EXISTING LEGAL STANDARDS ARE INDIVIDUALLY
INADEQUATE WHEN APPLIED TO DIRECTORS OF
CORPORATIONS WITH TRACKING STOCK
The traditional fiduciary analysis, the law regarding preferred
stockholders, and the courts' treatment of controlled subsidiaries each
individually provide inadequate legal standards for governing the
behavior of directors in the tracking-stock context. The traditional
fiduciary analysis, as adopted in Solomon and General Motors, is
unresponsive to the unique inter-group struggles present in corporations
that issue tracking stock. A contractual approach, as used in the
preferred-stock context, does not provide enough protection for
stockholders who have an equity interest beyond dividend payments. The
entire-fairness standard used in connection with parent-subsidiary
dealings is too onerous for directors who are expected to make daily
decisions regarding the allocation of wealth and opportunity to
competing business groups.
A. The Traditional Fiduciary Analysis Fails to Address the Inter-
Group Struggles Inherent in Tracking-Stock Corporations
The duties of care and loyalty do not address the unique inter-group
struggles inherent in corporations that issue tracking stock. 7' When
applied to cases involving tracking stock, the fiduciary analysis may
provide either too little or too much protection for stockholders.
Stockholders receive too much protection when the rights accompanying
the transaction at issue are clearly defined in the certificate of
incorporation. However, when directors make decisions that significantly
170. See id. (stating that "GM board did not have the power to unilaterally effectuate a freeze-out
merger on its own terms").
171. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2148,2156-57.
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alter the ownership interest of tracking stockholders, such as a decision
to spin-off a business group, stockholders are too vulnerable.
The application of the duty of loyalty to directors of corporations with
tracking stock is problematic because of the inevitability of conflicts of
interest. Assuming that the directorial duty to maximize stockholder
wealth runs to each class of stockholders, any self-interest among
directors would jeopardize this duty, thus implicating the duty of loyalty.
Considering that any director who owns stock in a particular business
group will have a potential conflict of interest, the courts in General
Motors and Solomon correctly framed the issue of loyalty in terms of the
materiality of the conflicting interests.172 Had the duty of loyalty been
implicated simply by a showing that a majority of directors owned stock
in one business group, as the plaintiffs in both cases suggested,173 the
mere allegation of conflict would have mandated that the directors either
prove the entire fairness of the transaction'74 or ratify the transaction by a
majority of disinterested stockholders to reclaim the protections of the
business judgment rule.'75 Given the inherent competition between
groups, stock-holding directors potentially could be required to prove the
entire fairness of every corporate transaction, virtually eliminating the
courts' deference to the corporate decision-making process.
When framing the application of fiduciary duties, the Solomon court
appears to have reached a compromise solution between protection of
stockholders and deference to directors. Although it stated that the
fiduciary duties run to each class of stockholders taken separately,'76 the
court's emphasis on a fair decision-making process seems to
acknowledge that directors cannot possibly fulfill their duties to each of
these groups of stockholders simultaneously. Thus, while it is inevitable
that the outcome of board decisions will routinely benefit one class of
stock over another,'77 courts will not question the directors' decisions as
172. See In re General Motors Class H Shareholders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 618 (Del. Ch. 1999);
Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1117-18.
173. See General Motors, 734 A.2d at 618; Solomon, 747 A.2d at 1117-18.
174. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
176. See Solomon, 747 A.2d 1098 at 1123-24.
177. See id.
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long as the process that the board of directors uses to reach those
decisions does not disadvantage any one class of stock.'78 However, this
compromise does not address situations in which a fiduciary-duty
analysis is simply inappropriate.
Even with the materiality requirements of Solomon, the application of
traditional fiduciary principles to tracking stockholders may be
inappropriate depending on the nature of the transaction. In circum-
stances such as the repurchase of stock or the payment of dividends,
where the expectations of the tracking stockholders are predominantly
contractual, the fiduciary analysis provides over-protection. If directors
have a material conflict of interest based on their ownership of a certain
class of tracking stock, and their decision to repurchase stock or issue a
dividend to that class of stockholders is not approved by a majority of
disinterested stockholders, the directors must defend the entire fairness of
that payment.'79 However, stockholder challenges to purely contractual
transactions implicate the fairness of the original contract between the
stockholders and the corporation, not the judgment of the directors. Thus,
if stockholders are entitled to an entire-fairness evaluation even when
directors comply with the contractual requirements for stock repurchases
and dividend payments, courts will apply fiduciary duties to issues of
contract, not corporate governance.
In the case of other transactions, such as inter-group transactions,
traditional fiduciary requirements may oppress tracking stockholders. If
directors negotiate a contract between business groups, such as an inter-
group loan, and the directors do not have any material interests in either
business group, traditional fiduciary principles will protect the business
judgment of the directors.'80 Yet such a contract does not necessarily
involve the business judgment of the directors and, consequently, the
board's decision should not receive deference. It is not difficult for
directors to determine whether a contract between business groups is fair;
the directors must simply look to the marketplace to determine what type
of deal the business group could have received had it dealt with an
independent third party.'8 ' Thus, considering the ease with which
178. See id.
179. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
180. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
181. In situations where there is no ascertainable market value for the contract, and directors are
asked to make difficult judgments about the fairness of the contract, courts should treat the decision
like an allocation decision and apply the traditional fiduciary-duty analysis. See infra notes 206-08
and accompanying text.
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directors may ascertain the fairness of inter-group contracts, the
traditional fiduciary duty analysis is inappropriate when applied to
corporate decisions regarding those transactions.
B. The Contractual Approach Fails to Resolve the Non-Contractual
Conflicts Arising in the Tracking-Stock Context
Similarly, the analogies to preferred stock drawn by General Motors
and Solomon are flawed. Tracking stock creates conflicts between groups
that cannot be resolved by contractual protections for two reasons. First,
tracking stock represents an equity interest that is more dependent upon
the performance of the corporation than preferred stock and thus
demands greater protection than preferred stock. Second, daily
judgments that directors make regarding the allocation of resources to
business groups are inherently difficult to reduce to contractual terms.
Tracking stock is analogous to preferred stock to the extent that
certain contractual provisions in the articles of incorporation define
certain rights of that class of stock.'82 Tracking stock, however,
represents an entirely different type of financial interest than preferred
stock and creates more frequent inter-class conflicts.'83 Therefore, the
minimal protections afforded preferred stockholders-criticized by some
as inadequate even in that context4--are insufficient safeguards in the
more conflict-laden and less contractual arena of tracking stock.
Unlike preferred stock, the value of tracking stock is not fixed.'85
Because the value of preferred stock is predetermined, it is unlikely that
preferred stockholders will benefit from improved financial
performance.' 86 Therefore, a directorial decision that negatively impacts
a business group's ability to profit or appreciate poses a greater threat of
financial damage to tracking stockholders than does the same decision to
preferred stockholders.
182. See supra notes 21, 128 and accompanying text.
183. See supra Part II.
184. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 443.
185. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2094-95.
186. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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Tracking stock is also difficult to reduce entirely to contractual
provisions. Whereas preferred stock lends itself to clearly defined
contractual terms, such as the timing and amount of dividend payments
or liquidation payments, tracking stock raises more complex issues. For
example, the decision to allocate corporate opportunity or resources
cannot always be reduced to a contractual formula. Rather, it is
dependent upon the directors' best judgment at a distinct moment in
time. If a contractual term in the certificate of incorporation did attempt
to deal with the infinite number of possible corporate opportunities, it is
unlikely that the term could provide much more protection than "good
faith"'87 on the part of the directors.
Finally, scholars have argued that Delaware's reliance on the contract
between preferred and common stockholders to define preferred
stockholder rights is flawed even in its application to preferred stock.'88
Because courts have allowed directors to subvert the interests of
preferred stockholders at the expense of the common stockholders,1
8 9
preferred stockholders lack any meaningful protection against allocation
of wealth away from their interests.'9" In the tracking-stock context,
where the allocation of wealth away from one class of stock occurs much
more frequently than in preferred stockholder situations, reliance on the
contractual terms defining the rights of tracking stockholders is
especially deficient.
C. The Sinclair Test Fails to Protect the Discretion of the Board of
Directors in Corporations Issuing Tracking Stock
Even though tracking stockholders are analogous to minority
stockholders in a parent-controlled subsidiary, the Sinclair test is
impractical in the tracking-stock context. Under Sinclair, stockholders
are entitled to a review of the entire fairness of the transaction whenever
one group of controlling stockholders receives a benefit at the expense of
another group of stockholders. 9 ' In the tracking-stock context, where
187. Mitchell, supra note 13, at 456 (stating that good-faith doctrine is intended "to prevent a
contracting party from opportunistically capitalizing upon the ambiguities of language to defeat the
other's legitimate contractual expectations").
188. See Rutherford B. Campell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Contractarian
Era, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 561,577 (1996); Mitchell, supra note 13, at 456.
189. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
190. See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 469-70.
191. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
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business groups are constantly competing, and virtually every day-to-day
decision could be subject to an entire-fairness review, importing the
Sinclair test would frustrate the directors' abilities to govern the
corporation.
Despite these differences, the plight of tracking stockholders is more
analogous to minority stockholders in a parent-controlled subsidiary than
the Solomon court was willing to acknowledge. 9 2 One of the primary
rationales for heightened scrutiny in the parent-subsidiary context is the
potential for continued oppression by the parent. 93 The same potential
for coerced ratification of a board's actions that exists in parent-
subsidiary dealings t94 is present in corporations that issue tracking
stock. 9 ' If a class of tracking stockholders refuses to ratify a decision by
the board, the board, on behalf of another controlling class of stock,
could retaliate by allocating funds to different business groups.'96
Considering this potential for coercion, "no court could be certain
whether the transaction terms fully approximate what truly independent
parties would have achieved in an arm's length negotiation."'97 Thus, it
seems reasonable that decisions that are subject to a coerced ratification
should be evaluated under a standard of entire fairness regardless of
whether the decision has been approved by the minority stockholders.
Further, under the Sinclair test, complaining tracking stockholders would
be entitled to a review of the fairness of the transaction if they could
demonstrate that a controlling class of stockholders received a benefit to
192. Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1121 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff'd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del.
2000). Because shareholders in Solomon had substantial protection from continuous oppression, the
court's rejection of the Sinclair standard was understandable. See supra notes 167-71 and
accompanying text.
193. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (citing Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)).
194. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
195. Conceivably, corporations might not provide protections against continuous oppression in
their articles of incorporation or might provide inadequate protections.
196. This Comment suggests that the possibility that a board of directors could retaliate against a
non-complying business group is not so remote. In the case of inter-group transactions, other classes
of shareholders could exert significant pressure on tracking stockholders to approve the terms of an
unfair sale.
197. Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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their detriment.'98 This would appear to be a fairly easy threshold to meet
in a tracking-stock corporation, where business groups are often
competing for the same corporate resources and opportunities.'99
It seems impractical, however, to submit every board decision
challenged by a tracking stockholder to an evaluation of entire fairness.
The fundamental assumption that directors are best equipped to manage
the corporation20 0 would be undermined if every decision regarding the
allocation of corporate resources or corporate opportunities were subject
to an entire-faimess evaluation before the court.20 Furthermore, with
increased disclosure by corporations regarding the internal conflicts that
directors may face when allocating resources or opportunities,2 2 tracking
stockholders should not expect every day-to-day corporate decision to be
entirely fair.
V. DELAWARE COURTS SHOULD APPLY A COMBINATION
OF EXISTING LEGAL STANDARDS DEPENDING ON THE
TRANSACTION IN QUESTION
In dealing with directorial conflicts in tracking-stock corporations,
courts should employ a combination of contractual duties, traditional
fiduciary duties, and parent-subsidiary duties framed around the nature of
the transaction. The nature of the transaction may be determined by
examining the degree of directorial discretion involved in the transaction,
the expectations of a reasonable tracking-stock investor, the provisions of
the articles of incorporation, and the potential for abuse by controlling
stockholders. Courts should provide protections to tracking stockholders
in proportion to these factors. If a transaction is purely contractual, courts
198. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). Under current Delaware
law, the key issue is control of the subsidiary. See Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of
Controlling Shareholders, 24 Del. J. Corp. L. 27, 38-39 (1999). Hence, entire fairness would not be
invoked in situations in which a non-controlling business group received an advantage to the
detriment of another non-controlling group.
199. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2122.
200. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
201. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
202. For example, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. left little room for confusion regarding the
task of its directors: "The board of directors of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., in its sole
discretion, will make operational and financial decisions and implement policies that may affect the
businesses of DLJ and DI-direct differently, potentially favoring one business at the expense of the
other." Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 10. This warning was followed by a
detailed list of potential areas of conflict. See id. at 11.
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should not provide fiduciary protections to tracking stockholders but
should instead look directly to the terms of the articles of incorporation.
If a transaction involves the allocation of wealth among business groups,
the courts should be more protective of tracking stockholders and should
apply the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the actions of the
directors. Finally, if the directorial decision at issue involves an inter-
group transaction, or significantly alters the nature of the tracking stock,
courts should subject the decision to the heightened scrutiny of an entire-
fairness evaluation.
If a transaction between stockholders and the corporation is purely
contractual-involving, for instance, dividend rights, voting rights,
liquidation rights, or exchange of stock-as defined in the corporation's
certificate of incorporation, courts should not provide fiduciary
protections. Instead, courts should borrow from preferred-stock cases and
enforce the terms of the tracking stockholder's contract with the
corporation."' Suppose, for example, that a stockholder challenges a
board's decision to pay dividends on one class of tracking stock. If, in its
articles of incorporation, a corporation has defined the circumstances in
which dividends are to be paid, the decision to pay dividends involves
little discretion on the part of directors. Because tracking stockholders
are reasonably expected to rely on contractual provisions, they should be
entitled only to contractual remedies.2"
In the case of daily directorial decisions involving the allocation of
corporate wealth and opportunity among business groups, however,
protections based on the certificate of incorporation are insufficient. A
board decision to allocate the proceeds from a sale of corporate assets to
a particular business group does not involve objective contractual
obligations, but rather is subject to the judgment of directors to determine
the best allocation of corporate resources. Although tracking-stock
investors may expect directors to allocate resources impartially, tracking
stockholders cannot expect that every corporate decision will maximize
their wealth; corporations are increasingly taking pains to alert potential
203. See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986).
204. Contractual remedies may include performance of the contract, or payment of damages
flowing from the corporation's breach of the terms of the articles of incorporation. See E. Allan
Famsworth, Contracts §§ 12.1-.3, at 755-65 (3d ed. 1999).
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investors of the potential conflicts of interests that directors face when
allocating corporate wealth and opportunity among competing tracking
stockholders." 5 Thus, with regard to allocation decisions, a reasonable
and informed investor should be at least minimally familiar with the
difficulties facing directors and cannot expect entire fairness.
Therefore, courts should apply the traditional duties of care and
loyalty to allocation decisions0 6 and only subject the decision to an
entire-fairness evaluation if the directors have a material interest in the
transaction.0 7 The duty of loyalty ensures, at the least, that corporate
directors are not subordinating the interests of one class of tracking
stockholders to their own personal interests.0 8 Under this standard,
courts would not scrutinize an allocation decision unless the challenging
stockholder could demonstrate that a majority of directors had a personal
interest in one class of stock,09 thus leaving business decisions in the
hands of directors. Because decisions regarding allocations often involve
judgment calls about the best use of corporate resources, it may be
difficult for directors to prove fair dealing with regard to these decisions.
The business judgment rule would properly protect these intuitive
decisions and allow directors to carry out their day-to-day duties without
the constant threat that a decision to move resources within the
corporation will be subjected to ail entire-fairness inquiry."0
In other circumstances, stockholders can expect more than impartiality
from directors, and courts should evaluate the entire fairness of the
transaction. When a board of directors negotiates a transaction between
business groups,2 ' a stockholder can reasonably expect that the board
will negotiate the transaction as if the business groups were dealing with
an independent third party." 2 These transactions do not involve directors'
205. See, e.g., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., supra note 6, at 10.
206. Some allocation decisions, for example, major corporate opportunities or resource
allocations, may be so significant that they alter the substance of the ownership interest. These
transactions should be dealt with under the entire-faimess standard. See infra notes 211-13 and
accompanying text.
207. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
208. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
209. See id
210. The directors do have the ability to reclaim the protection of the business judgment rule if
the decision is ratified by a majority of fully informed shareholders. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text.
211. See supra Part U.C.
212. In fact, some corporations have affirmed this expectation in their corporate filings. See, e.g.,
Sprint Corp., supra note 18, at 31-32.
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value judgments about the most effective allocation of resources or
opportunities; rather, the fairness of the transaction can be clearly
measured against the terms of the transaction that would have been
available if the board had bargained with a third party. For example, if a
board of directors negotiates a contract for the sale of goods between two
business groups, the fairness of that transaction would be apparent if the
price of the goods reflected fair market value. Thus, transactions between
business groups should not afford directors the same protections as
allocation decisions.
Likewise, when a corporate decision significantly alters the ownership
interest of tracking stockholders, such as a spin-off of a business group
or the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a group, those
stockholders can expect more than impartiality. Regardless of what
statements are made in corporate filings qualifying the rights of tracking
stockholders, investors have a reasonable expectation that the business
they are investing in will remain substantially the same.213 Thus, if a
board decides to redefine the nature of a business group, sell all or
substantially all of the assets of the business group, or spin-off that
business group, the investors in that stock can reasonably expect that
such a decision would be entirely fair. Therefore, courts should apply the
entire-fairness determination of Sinclair1 4 to inter-group transactions and
to those transactions which significantly alter the ownership interest of a
tracking stock.
VI. CONCLUSION
As tracking stock becomes more prevalent, it is likely that courts will
confront claims by disgruntled tracking stockholders. Courts should not
try to force the unique equity structure of tracking stock into one of the
three existing legal standards. The traditional fiduciary-duty analysis is
unresponsive to the unique inter-group struggles in the tracking-stock
context and as a result provides either over- or underprotection to
stockholders. The contractual approach used in the preferred-stock
213. The ability to be specific about one's investment choice is one of the prime advantages of
tracking stock. See Hass, supra note 2, at 2090.
214. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (1971).
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context is also inadequate because tracking stocks are more dependent on
corporate performance and cannot be reduced to purely contractual
provisions. Finally, the entire-fairness standard used in connection with
parent-subsidiary dealings is too onerous for directors who are expected
to make daily decisions regarding the allocation of wealth and
opportunity to competing business groups.
The applicable legal standard should depend on the nature of the
transaction at issue. This inquiry would turn on the degree of directorial
discretion involved in the transaction, the expectations of the investing
stockholder, the provisions of the articles of incorporation, and the
potential for abuse by controlling stockholders. If the transaction is
purely contractual, courts should provide tracking stockholders with only
the rights granted to those stockholders in the company's articles of
incorporation. If the transaction involves the allocation of corporate
resources among business groups, courts should be moderately protective
of tracking stockholders. To balance stockholder expectations of
impartiality and deference to a board's business judgment, courts should
apply the duties of care and loyalty to allocation decisions, granting the
protections of the business judgment rule unless the directors have a
material financial interest in a business group. Finally, if the directorial
decision involves an inter-group transaction, courts should be especially
protective of tracking stockholders. Inter-group transactions involve little
discretion on the part of directors, but the potential for abuse is relatively
high. Therefore, courts should evaluate the entire fairness of inter-group
dealings in the tracking-stock context regardless of whether the directors
have a material financial interest in any of the business groups involved
in the transaction.
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